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This paper develops a quantitative, graph-theoretic method for analysing systems of 
institutions. With an application to the agricultural innovation system of Azerbaijan, the 
method is illustrated in detail. An assessment of existing institutional linkages in the system 
suggests that efforts should be placed on the development of intermediary institutions to 
facilitate quick and effective flow of knowledge between the public and the private 
components of the system. Furthermore, significant accomplishments are yet to come in 
policy-making, research and education, and credit institutions. 
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With the recent advancement of efficient computing algorithms and of computational 
capacity of computers, some of the concepts and techniques in graph theory have found wide 
applications in economics, political science, sociology, and psychology (Cormen, Leiserson, 
and Rivest, 1990; Shrum, 1997; Biggs and Matsaert, 1999; Richardson, 1999; OECD, 1997, 
1999; Scott, 2000). It has also become widely recognized that these techniques serve as 
useful tools for analysis of not only engineering but also economic systems (Leontief, 1951; 
Manescu, 1980; Murota, 1987; Hudson, 1992). 
Early attempts applying the systems approach to economics remained at the conceptual level, 
as it was not only problematic to express agents’ behaviour mathematically but also difficult 
to measure it quantitatively. During the recent years, however, representation of systems as 
square matrices made it possible to bridge the gap between conceptual descriptions of 
systems and their quantitative characterizations. And the bridge was occupied with 
practitioners applying graph theoretical concepts, techniques, and results. Freeman (1997, 
2000), for example, demonstrated the application of social network analysis to the analysis of 
hierarchical properties in organizational structures. Employing some of the concepts of graph 
theory, OECD (1997b, 1999) studied patterns common in innovation systems of the selected 
OECD countries. The list can be extended at will. 
The present study seeks to develop a graph-theoretic method for quantitative assessment of 
institutional linkages
2 and institutional hierarchies in a system. The method adopts a 
framework in which the linkages do not assume ad hoc mathematical functional forms, 
reducing the complications likely to be faced in the integration of detailed physical, 
environmental, and institutional constraints into the system at hand. The method is especially 
useful to evaluate surveys consisting of questions with scaled answers. Qualitative 
information in these answers, expressed in scales as none, weak, medium, and strong, is 
translated into 0 for a nonexistent, 0.3 for a weak, 0.6 for a medium, and 1 for a strong 
relation. These values are then placed in the off-diagonal cells of the square matrix, each row 
of which represents an individual component in the system. This completes the representation 
of the system as a square matrix.
3 Finally, the method is applied the agricultural innovation 
system of Azerbaijan to examine interactions between the key components, to identify the 
dominant and subordinate components, to show how to develop effective agricultural 
policies, and to discuss ways to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of the system. To 
accomplish all, we use data from the survey results of Temel, Janssen, and Karimov (2001). 
Quantification of interactions between institutions in an innovation system means a lot to the 
economic development community. It first means that dynamics of knowledge generation, 
diffusion, and application and hence of economic development, can be in part studied from an 
institutional perspective in order to provide modellers with information on the institutional 
parameters. Discovering the dominant and subordinate institutions, for example, is one such 
                                                 
1 We like to extend our thanks to a large number of people: Thanks to interviewees for sharing their views on 
the developments in the agricultural sector in Azerbaijan, to Prof. Jalal Aliyev, Dr. Mamadzadeh Nabiyev, Dr. 
Asad Musayev, Mr. Irsad Aliyev, Dr. Eldar Kosayev, Mr. Ahmedov Vugar, Dr. Akberov Zeynal, and Dr. 
Mahmudov Rafail for their insights into the workings of the system, and to Dr. Larry Zuidema for his 
contribution to the preparation of the Questionnaires and to the final reporting. Finally, many thanks go to 
seminar participants at ISNAR for their very useful comments on the earlier version of the report. While 
acknowledging contributions from a wide variety of participants, we are responsible for the content of the study. 
2 The terms, linkages, interactions, and relations are interchangeably used throughout the study. 
3 Rescaling this square matrix in such a way to obtain a stochastic matrix, each row of which adds up to one, 





information that can be incorporated into the overall objective function of the system. 
Modelling would further benefit greatly from information on the direction of influence 
between the two institutions in the system. Such information would facilitate the 
representation of institutional interactions in mathematical formats. Knowledge of the 
sequencing of institutional interactions would especially be valuable for constructing game 
theoretic models, as equilibria in these models are often conditional to a specific sequencing 
of institutional decisions. 
What qualifies systems analysis to be the unique framework for examining innovation 
systems is the observation that science is necessary but not sufficient for the generation, 
diffusion, and application of new technologies and that learning takes place everywhere in 
society (EC, 2000). Although this is a powerful framework to understand the workings of 
innovation systems conceptually, such frameworks are not enough for policy makers to 
design and implement feasible science and technology policies consistent with overall 
economic goals. They need quantitative methods to compare alternative policies and predict 
consequences of their decisions and/or actions. With systems analysis by graph theoretic 
techniques, they should at least be in the position of identifying the existing cause-effect 
structures and detecting leverage points and mismatches in the system, and of developing 
alternative scenarios or mechanisms to release the constraints on innovative performance of 
the system. 
Countries in transition seem to be most suitable for applying our methodology, as they are 
currently busy with building new knowledge systems and decision makers are in serious need 
of such tools to understand the workings of innovation systems. Our method would therefore 
be beneficial to technocrats of these countries to experiment with various policy reforms and 
understand their impact under laboratory conditions. 
Following the Introduction, Section 2 describes our graph theoretical method. Section 3 
shows how to make the method operational, with an application to the AIS of Azerbaijan. 
Section 4 discusses how to use the method to derive lessons for the improvement of the AIS. 
Finally, Section 5 concludes the study. 
2.  A graph theoretical method 
The graph theoretical method that we seek to develop combines two fields of research: 
systems analysis in engineering and graph theory in discrete mathematics. The reason is that 
graph theory offers useful techniques and concepts that can be used in assessing properties of 
a system quantitatively. We define system as a set of agents or institutions organized around a 
common goal. A system has several characteristics. First, it must have a goal determining the 
type of institutions or agents to be included in the system. It should capture only those 
interactions related to the predetermined goal. Second, all of the interactions in the system 
should be expressed in a common unit of measure. Third, influence of an agent on itself and 
others must be bounded. 
Several graph theoretical concepts are borrowed from discrete mathematics, and modified in 
such a way to reflect the specificities of the system under investigation. To start with, we set 
the goal of the system to be examined, make a list of agents likely to operate in the system, 
define linkage mechanisms that serve the goal, and translate qualitative data collected by a 
survey into quantitative scales. Here are some useful concepts. 
Concept I: An interaction matrix. Matrix representation of systems allows us to study their 
underlying properties, such as controllability, solvability, and decomposability (Murota, 





Suppose, for example, that the system under investigation is an innovation system consisting 
of institutions organized around the goal to develop, diffuse, and apply new or improved 
technologies. For illustrative purposes, consider a system of 5 components
4: Policy (P), 
Research and education (R), Extension and information (I), Farm organization (F), and 
External assistance (X). Interactions between these components are described following the 
clock-wise convention, and the components are placed in the diagonal and their binary (one-























XF XI XR XP
FX FI FR FP
IX IF IR IP
RX RF RI RP
PX PF PI PR
. 
The term PR placed in the first row-second column of S denotes that Component P interacts 
with Component R, and that P is the source of this interaction; likewise, the term RP placed 
in the second row–first column of S denotes that R interacts with P, and that R is the source 
of this interaction. Binary interactions of these kinds shown in S represent one-edge paths as 
they take place between two components only and contain no intermediate component(s). For 
notational simplicity we would sometimes refer to the interaction PR by P→R (or RP by 
R→P). 
Concept 2: A coded interaction matrix. A value 1 (0) in S[c] implies that the corresponding 
interaction in matrix S above exists (does not exist) and is important (unimportant) for the 


















X 1 0 0 0
0 F 0 1 0
1 1 I 0 1
0 1 1 R 0
1 0 1 1 P
. 
According to the codes in S[c], P influences R, I, and X. Similarly, R influences I and F; I 
influences P, F, and X; F influences R only; and finally, X influences F only. Note that the 
interaction denoted by PR exists but not the other way around. This is manifested by 1 in the 
first row–second column of S[c] and by 0 in the second row-first column of S[c]. Likewise, F 
does not influence X, while X influences F. This is manifested by 0 in the fourth row-fifth 
column and by 1 in the fifth row-fourth column of S[c]. What this coding convention implies 
is that interactions in S[c] are directional and not necessarily symmetric. Below, we show the 
system S[c] in a different format that can be used for visual detection of patterns, where black 
(white) cells indicate the existing (absent) relations. 
                                                 
4 Throughout the paper the terms “actors”, “agents”, “institutions”, and “components” are all used to refer to 












A third format to represent S[c]  is to define it as a digraph (i.e., 
directed graph).  The  digraph  consists of five actors (or 
vertices) (P, R, I, F, X) and assumes an implicit function that translates the interactions into 
real values: 1 or 0. Although it is difficult to immediately recognize patterns in the following 







Social relations are difficult but not impossible to quantify. Surveys with scaled questions can 
be used to quantify such relations. One way to accomplish it is to ask questions that can 
easily be scaled as weak, medium, and strong or formal, informal, and mixed, etc. A number 
between 0 and 1 can be arbitrarily assigned to each element of a scale. For example, a degree 
of interaction between the two institutions can be perceived as weak or strong depending on 
the amount of information flow between them. If an interaction is perceived as weak, a value 
of 0.3 can be assigned to it, 0.6 if medium, and 1 if strong. Such coding of interactions is 
commonly used in studies of psychology and sociology. Once scaled, the system of 
interactions between actors can then be represented visually and quantitatively. 
Concept 3: Qualitative coding. Qualitative information on the nature of binary interactions in 
S[c] can be incorporated into the analysis by attributing (+) or (-) signs to an interaction 
between the two components. For illustrative purposes, let us suppose that this qualitative 





















X 1 0 0 0
0 F 0 1 0
1 1 I 0 1
0 1 1 R 0
1 0 1 1 P
. 
Visual format of S[c] 
P         
  R       
    I     
      F   





A value 1 assigned to the cell RF in S[q] indicates that R influences F positively. On the 
contrary, a value -1 in the cell FR indicates that F influences R negatively. Negative 
influence usually occurs between competing actors that share the same objective and operate 
under the same resource constraints. 
Concept 4: Binary versus pathways of interactions. P→R is a binary (one-edge) interaction 
but P→I→F→R is a pathway (three-edge) of interactions between P and R. In S[c] the 
former interaction represents a direct contact between P and R, while the latter implies three 
intermediary contacts in between P and R: P influences I, which then influences F, which 
then influences R. The choice between one-edge and three-edge interactions depends on 


















X 1 0 0 0
0 F 0 5 0
4 3 I 0 2
0 2 1 R 0
1 0 1 3 P
. 
Implicit in the coding of S[v] is the assumption that each actor has an objective function and 
a set of constraints, and that a common decision made by an actor influences others’ 
performance. We further assume that these cross-actor influences (i.e., binary influences) can 
be quantifiable by an implicit function. Suppose that the system at hand has the influence 
structure in S[v]. The binary relation P→R in S[v] has a value 3, which indicates the level of 
P’s influence on R. If the relation between P and R follows a pathway, for example, 
P→I→F→R, then the level of interaction would take on a value 9, which is the sum of 
values assigned to each edge: that is, 1 is assigned to P→I, 3 to I→F, and 5 to F→R. If the 
objective is to maximize (minimize) the influence, then the pathway P→I→F→R (the binary 
relation P→R) will be the optimal choice. 
Concept 5: A cause-effect structure. What is the underlying cause-effect structure implied by 
S[v]? In other words, which agents in the system S[v] are sources of influences and which 
ones are sinks? To answer this question, we need to define the terms Cause (C) and Effect 
(E). Cause of an agent is defined as the sum of influences in the respective row of S[v], and 
Effect of others on that agent is defined as the sum of influences in the respective column of 
S[v]. S[v] implies the following cause-effect (or source-sink) coordinates (C, E): (5, 2) for P, 
(3, 8) for R, (9, 2) for I, (5, 6) for F, and (1, 5) for X. 
Not surprisingly, in social sciences, causes and effects are difficult to measure 
mathematically, making it difficult to establish the system S[v]. But, we can relatively easily 
construct the system S[c] as it only includes binary information. The (C, E)-coordinates of 
S[c] are (3, 1) for P, (2, 2) for R, (3,2) for I, (1, 3) for F, and (1, 2) for X. Figure 1 shows the 
























Following the same procedure, one can also establish a scaled cause-effect structure to reflect 
a more realistic picture of interactions prevailing in the system. 
Concept 6: Density of the cause-effect structure. The density, d, of the cause–effect structure 
is calculated as d=b/[n(n-1)] with 1≥ d ≥ 0, where b denotes the total number of existing 
binary interactions, and n is the number of dimension in S[c]. Given this definition, the 
density of S[c] is 0.5 where b=10 and n=5. Fully identified structures will have d=1, implying 
that all agents are connected to each other. 
Concept 7: A cluster. A cluster is a subset of actors that have close cause-effect coordinates. 
The cause-effect diagram is a useful tool for detecting clusters in the system. This concept, 
useful especially in a system with a large number of actors, helps us identify subsystems and 
examine their characteristics. 
3.  An application 
3.1.  Definitions: National innovation systems and agricultural innovation systems 
The literature introduces various definitions of national innovation system. Freeman (1987), 
for example, defines it as a network of institutions in the public and private sectors whose 
activities and interactions initiate, import, modify, and diffuse new technologies. Nelson 
(1993) describes it as a set of institutions whose interactions determine the innovative 
performance of productive units. Metcalfe (1995) and Smith et al. (1996) consider it as set of 
distinct institutions that jointly and individually contribute to the development, diffusion, and 
application of new technologies. While the above definitions are quite similar at face value, 
there are some differences in meaning, emphasis, and use of the concept. The key difference 
is that some view the concept as a simple aggregation of institutions, while others point at the 
synergies that originate from their joint operation. Our point of departure is the view that the 
innovation system is not a simple aggregation of organizations but it is a group of agents who 
operate like an invisible orchestra, each member of which plays pieces of a one-big melody 
with an invisible harmony among them. This orchestra would be characterized by coherence, 
harmony, and synergy: Coherence brings different pieces under the same melody; harmony 
creates a tune that keeps the members around the same spirit; and synergy ties them more 
strongly around the common goal. Adapting the above definitions into our context, we 
propose the following definition, which will be referred to throughout this study: 
An agricultural innovation system (AIS) is a set of agents (i.e., farm organizations, input 





institutions, extension and information units, private consultancy firms, international 
development agencies, and the government) that jointly and/or individually contribute to the 
development, diffusion, and use of new technologies, and that directly and/or indirectly 
influence the process of technological change. 
3.2.  Data 
Data are obtained from the Agricultural Innovation Questionnaire (AIQ) carried out in 
Azerbaijan (see Temel, Janssen, and Karimov, 2001). The AIQ covers a total of 9 
components including policy, research, education, credit, extension and information, inputs-
outputs-processing-marketing, farm organization, consultancy, and external assistance. It was 
used to interview a total of 63 persons: 7 policy makers, 12 directors of agricultural research 
institutes, 5 professors and graduate students, 1 director from credit institutions, 4 extension 
and information specialists, 8 directors from private input supply, processing, and marketing 
enterprises, 10 farmers from large and small farm organizations, 11 directors of private 
consultancy firms, and 5 project managers from international development agencies. 
The AIQ is organized into 5 sections. Section 1 provides information on organizational 
profiles, including internal and external factors that influence organizational performance. 
Section 2 characterizes innovation activities, presenting information on types and goals of the 
activities, sources of knowledge about innovations, funding mechanisms, and factors that 
constrain the activities. Section 3 describes linkages that organizations develop during the 
innovation process, with special emphasis on strength of linkages, linkage mechanisms used, 
and constraining factors. Section 4 characterizes the most recent innovation developed or 
diffused or used by the respondent’s organization. Section 5 intends to describe the science 
and technology policy in place. The current study utilizes information in Section 3 only as 
this is the section where the nature of linkages between the 9 components is explored. 
3.3. Description  of  the  components of the AIS 
Policy Component (P) comprises 5 key units operating under the responsibility of the Cabinet 
of Ministers. These units are the State Committee for Science and Technology (SCST), the 
Ministry of Agriculture (MoA), the Ministry of Education (MoE), the Ministry of Finance 
(MoF), and the Ministry of Economy (MoEc). In addition, each unit has several operational 
committees and commissions performing specific tasks to support the formulation of 
agricultural policy in general, and agricultural research policy in particular. Presently, the 
SCST is at a standstill due to the absence of science and technology priorities at the national 
level and the lack of qualified human resources at the organizational level. The MoA and 
MoE are also undergoing major reorganizations concerning the coordination of agricultural 
research and education institutes and the management of information dissemination activities. 
Research Component (R) consists of a total of 26 research institutes, 15 of which are under 
the Agrarian Science Center (ASC) of the MoA and 11 operate under several committees and 
the Academy of Sciences. Of these 11 institutes, 6 belong to the Academy of Sciences, 3 to 
the Committee for Water Economy, one to the Committee for State Land, and one to the 
“Azerforest” industrial amalgamation. In late 1996, the Agency for Support to the 
Development of Private Agricultural Sector (ASDPAS) was established to manage projects 
initiated by donors and international development agencies, being responsible towards the 
State Commission for Assistance to Agricultural Private Farm Sector Development. In early 
2000, the Agricultural Research Board (ARB) was created to coordinate the Competitive 





Education Component (E) comprises 42 universities (25 public, 17 private) and 77 colleges 
(73 public, 4 private), all of which are under the partial supervision of MoE. Soon, the MoE 
is expected to assume full responsibility for all educational institutions, including 21 
agricultural colleges and one Agricultural Academy that used to be under the control of the 
MoA (ARKTN, 2000). The Agricultural Academy should, according to its mandate, engage 
in both teaching and research (mostly theoretical). The colleges, on the other hand, should 
engage in both teaching and applied research. The MoA will still be expected to supervise 
post-graduate education through the Head Dept. Scientific Research, Education, and 
Personnel Training (HDSREPT). Every year, a total of 8-10 post-graduate students are 
accepted to the 15 research institutes of the ASC. Moreover, there are several agriculture-
related faculties in Azerbaijan State University and other engineering and technical 
universities. Newly established in 2001 is the Agricultural Education Department in the MoE. 
This Department is responsible for administrative coordination and curriculum preparation of 
the agricultural education institutions. 
Credit Component (C) is the weakest component. Extensive efforts are made to restructure 
and reorganize it. By the end of 1999, the banking system comprised 70 banks, down from 
180 in 1995. Four state-owned banks dominated the system, basically extending loans to 
public enterprises. For the last two years, no credit was provided to the agricultural sector. 
The 66 private banks also remained in a precarious state (Owen et al. 2000; ARKTN, 2000). 
At present, preparations are underway to merge the Agro-Industry and Security banks to 
create a Universal Bank. Most recently, the government of Azerbaijan has established an oil 
fund to help mobilize resources to rural sector in general, and to the agricultural sector in 
particular. 
Extension and Information Component (I) comprises various subcomponents. The 
Information and Consulting Services Center (ICSC) was established in 2000 within the 
framework of the ADCP. Its task is to coordinate information and extension services 
specified in the ADCP, and its main activities are carried out at its regional branches. These 
branches provide extension services to people with land but without farming skills and to 
those without knowledge of how to prepare business plans or apply for credits or loans. 
Another activity of the Center, again through its branches, is to disseminate research results 
of projects implemented within the context of the competitive grants program. The 
Information Dissemination Unit (IDU) of the MoA was established in 1998 to coordinate 
agricultural knowledge flow at the national level. The IDU supports the introduction of new 
techniques or methods for information gathering about the current status of farming activities, 
provides extension services to farmers, and disseminates information about the new 
techniques available. Private enterprises also provide services in the information and 
extension sector. They are promoted indirectly by the ADCP and the FPP activities. Several 
water user associations, agro-business firms, and agro-consulting centers have emerged 
around the pilot study areas of the ADCP and the FPP. 
Private Enterprise Component (M) includes private input and supply, processing, and 
marketing firms. Typically, a firm engages in all kinds of activities: input supply, processing, 
and marketing. The increasing number of such firms should bring specialization in the near 
future. As many as 20 input supply firms currently operates in the market. Some of them have 
grown out of the pre-independence co-operatives, while others have been newly established. 
With a total of 1759 agricultural processing enterprises, which are presently under the 
subordination of the Ministry of State Property for Privatization, the processing sector is 





processes. Currently, of 1759 enterprises, 1121 are involved with food processing (114 in 
grapes, 40 in canneries, 33 in meat and dairy, 19 in cotton, and 14 in tea), 540 with weaving, 
and 98 with leather processing. There are also a total of 42 food-canning factories to be 
privatized. The food industry currently accounts for 12.9 percent of total labor force. A 
relatively speedy privatization has taken place in the cotton sector. At the moment, all 19 
cotton-processing plants are in private hands. Meat and milk products were and still are 
important in the diet of the Azeri people. Forty percent of total household food expenses are 
for the purchase of milk and dairy products, 26 percent for meat and meat products. For such 
a vital sector, recent developments are not as significant, although the market for dairy 
products shows some progress.
5 
Private Farm Component (F) includes 6 types of farms: household farms, farmers’ holdings, 
collective enterprises, leased enterprises, production cooperatives, and small enterprises. 
Large farms could play a considerable role in the diffusion of new technologies as they 
undertake production, processing, and marketing activities simultaneously. They benefit from 
their structural suitability to the irrigation infrastructure and relatively easy access to other 
farm inputs on the one hand, and their close connections with experimental stations of 
research institutes on the other. Small farms, on the other hand, literally lack everything, but 
most important of all, they lack land large enough to think about farming for markets. They 
also lack the knowledge and skills required for market oriented farm production. Under these 
circumstances, they can only grow crops and livestock for own consumption. 
Private Consultancy Component (D) emerged in 1998, with the law allowing for private 
consultancy firms. Since then, around 35 consultancy firms were founded. Many of them 
employ academicians, researchers, and post-graduate students. Their activities grow through 
opportunities offered by donors and international development agencies, and the areas of 
focus include agricultural, ecological, and agro-business issues. In many cases these firms are 
spin-off entities growing around the “Information and Consulting Services” component of the 
ADCP. This component seeks to help farmers find appropriate sources of credits and prepare 
business plans. The consultancy firms aim to provide all kinds of services to farmers, ranging 
from preparing business plans to problem diagnosis. 
External Assistance Component (X) is the stick place on a slippery surface. This component 
includes a variety of international development agencies, donors, and NGOs, and has been 
the key entry point for new or improved knowledge, processes, and practices. Joint project-
based activities are the means for exposing national entities to international standards. These 
activities usually involve private consultancy firms, as they have relatively better human and 
physical resources and have flexible organizational structures. Public entities, however, have 
been slow in adapting to international standards due to organizational rigidities, continuing 
organizational changes, and lack of qualified human resources. 
In the paragraphs above we have described the key responsibilities and activities of 
organizations in each component of the AIS. In addition, in Chart 1 below, we provide a 
visual classification of these organizations that is based on 6 functions: general policy-
making (F1), policy formulation, co-ordination, supervision and assessment (F2), financing 
R&D (F3), R&D performance (F4), technology application (F5), and technology applying 
(F6).
6 This chart is an extremely useful tool to quickly identify those organizations that 
perform similar role while belonging to different components. For example, the fourth layer 
                                                 
5 The reader is referred to ARKTN (2000) for a more detailed information. 





shows that experiment stations of the ASC, NGOs, private agro-consulting firms, Information 
and Consulting Services Center, and Competitive Grants System are all involved in R&D 
financing and technology dissemination activities. But, experiment stations and Competitive 
Grants System belong to R, Information Services Center to I, and NGOs to EA, Therefore, 
one should logically expect linkages between these three components performing similar 
tasks. 
In the previous paragraph we implicitly use two functionals.
7 The first maps the 6 
organizational functions onto organizational types and the second maps organizational types 
onto the 9 components of the AIS. Analysis of each layer in Chart 1 should, therefore, shed 
light onto the currently existing linkages between the components or linkages likely to 
emerge in the future. 
3.4. Description  of  interactions between the components 
Using the information drawn from Section 3 of the AIQ, we prepared Table 1 (henceforth 
Interaction Matrix) that indicates a structure for linkages between the 9 components. This 
structure is characterized by information on (i) three types of linkages as formal (f), informal 
(i), and mixed (m), (ii) four levels of linkage strength as strong (s), medium (m), weak (w), 
and none (n) (see Form 9 in Section 3 of the AIQ), and (iii) five groups of linkage 
mechanisms (see List 3 in Section 3 of the AIQ). This information is placed on the off-
diagonal cells of the matrix S below, and interactions between the components follow 
clockwise rotation shown by a thick arrow in the interaction matrix. The first row of the 
matrix presents the information obtained from organizations of P. It shows the mechanisms 
and the ways by which these organizations influence the rest of the system. Likewise, the 
information on the second row indicates how R influences the rest of the system. Information 
placed in the columns of the matrix indicates by which mechanisms others in the system 
influence P. Thick arrows on the matrix show the direction of influence. The diagonal cells 
include individual components. The notation (fw) stands for a formal-weak relation, (fm) 
formal-medium, (fs) formal-strong, (iw) informal-weak, (im) informal-medium, (is) informal-
strong, (mw) mixed-weak, (mm) mixed-medium, and (ms) mixed-strong. Zeros that appear in 
some of the off-diagonal cells imply either that interaction does not exist between relevant 
components or that it exists at a negligible level, or that it exists but investigator was not able 
to identify it. 
                                                 
7  m:F⇒O defines a correspondence relation between organizational functions F={f1,…,f6}  and subsets of 
organizations Oj ⊂O where O={o1,…,on}. h:Oj→C defines a functional relation between subsets of organizations 





































0 0 F 0 0
0 M 0 0 0
0 I 0 0
0 0 0 0 C 0 0
0 0 0 E
0 R
0 0 0 P
1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1
1 1




fm fm mw fs fw fm
fm mm iw fm mm im im
mw iw im im
mw mm im fm
fw fm fm fm fm
fw fw
fw im iw fw fw
fw im im mm mw fw fw
fm mw fw fw fw
 
The matrix S has several distinct features. First, it shows that the AIS is not fully identified. 
Of a total of 72 relations, only 45 are identified. The AIS has a density of 0.63 (= 45/72) and 
the component C is fully isolated from the rest of the system. Second, it shows that the AIS is 
fairly flexible. Of 45 relations, 25 are formal (13 weak, 11 medium, 1 strong), 11 informal (3 
weak, 8 medium, 0 strong), 9 mixed (5 weak, 4 medium, 0 strong). Third, all relations are 
formal and weak (fw) between the public components (P, R, E, C), while relations are mixed 
and mostly medium between the private components (I, M, F, D). This suggests a much 
stronger connection between the private components than that between the public sector 
components. Fourth, not surprisingly, informal relations are common between the public and 
the private components, reflected especially by the dominantly informal relations between 
(R, E) and (I, M, F, D). Equivalently important in this respect is the willingness of (M, F, D) 
to develop contacts with P, which is implied by (fm, im, im) in the first column and (0, 0, 0) 
in the first row. Lastly, the component X has one way or another developed relations with all 
the components in the system. Among these relations, the strongest ones are with I, F, D, and 
P. 
3.5.  Quantification of the interactions 
Below, we construct the matrix S[Scaled] by expressing linkage strengths in S in terms of 
codes (i.e., a number between 0 and 1). The coding rule followed assigns a value of 0.3 to a 
weak, 0.6 to a medium, and 1 to a strong relation.
9 Figure 2 shows the cause-effect structure 
associated with the matrix S[Scaled]. According to this structure, the component D dominates 
over the AIS (i.e., source of influence) as it has more effect on the rest of the components 
than others’ effect on it. Interestingly, however, the component R is highly interactive
10 with 
the rest of the AIS, and is followed by X, I, and F. Furthermore, the component P is found to 
be subordinate (i.e., sink of influence) since it is influenced by others more than it influences 
them. Lastly, the component C has very low interaction with the rest of the AIS. 
                                                 
8 The links with a superscript 1 in S represent those established through specific linkage mechanisms. These are 
the links to which a value 1 is assigned to create S[Mechanism]. 
9 The coding rule considers linkage strengths only because the AIQ does not have information on the 
effectiveness and efficiency of linkage types. Without such information one can hardly express linkage types in 
terms of codes. 


































X 6 . 0 6 . 0 3 . 0 1 0 0 3 . 0 6 . 0
6 . 0 D 6 . 0 3 . 0 6 . 0 0 6 . 0 6 . 0 6 . 0
0 0 F 3 . 0 0 0 3 . 0 6 . 0 6 . 0
3 . 0 0 6 . 0 M 0 0 0 6 . 0 6 . 0
3 . 0 6 . 0 6 . 0 0 I 0 0 6 . 0 6 . 0
3 . 0 0 0 0 0 C 0 0 3 . 0
3 . 0 6 . 0 3 . 0 0 0 0 E 3 . 0 3 . 0
3 . 0 6 . 0 6 . 0 6 . 0 3 . 0 0 3 . 0 R 3 . 0
6 . 0 0 0 0 3 . 0 3 . 0 3 . 0 3 . 0 P
 
 
























Presented below is a visual representation of the information in S[Scaled], where white cells 
represent nonexistent linkages, grey cells weak linkages, black cells medium linkages, and 
heavily dark cells strong linkages.
11 The visual tool would help us detect areas to be 
strengthened for facilitating an effective and efficient flow of knowledge, while the cause-
effect structure would indicate the components that can serve as the source and the ultimate 
target of this knowledge. 
                                                 
11 It is straightforward to develop computer algorithms to generate cause-effect structures and visual 
















S[Mechanism]  shows only those 
linkages established  through  specific 
linkage  mechanisms in List 
3 of the AIQ in  Temel,  Janssen, 
Karimov (2001). The density of S[Scaled] sharply declines from 0.63 to 0.35 in 
S[Mechanism]. Furthermore, polarization tends to emerge between the private and public 
sectors. The components (D,  X,  I,  F) move upward, while others move downward. The 
component D remains to be the dominant one, which is followed by I. The component X is 
most interactive, which is followed by F. On the other hand, P remains to be the most 
subordinate component (Figure 3). A visual examination of the AIS shows that D and X often 
perform by using linkage mechanisms. This can in part be attributed to the fact that their 






























X 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 1
1 D 1 0 1 0 1 1 1
0 0 F 1 0 0 1 1 1
1 0 1 M 0 0 0 0 0
1 1 1 0 I 0 0 1 1
0 0 0 0 0 C 0 0 0
1 0 0 0 0 0 E 0 0
1 1 0 0 0 0 0 R 0
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 P
 
 
A visual representation of S[Scaled] 
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4.  Discussion: when  and 
how to use  our  method 
Decision  makers  can use the 
Interaction Matrix to assess the impact of alternative decisions as it encompasses all of the 
possible pathways in a system under investigation. Consider, for example, the pathway 
P→C→I→F→R→P. This is a feedback pathway in which initial change takes place in P and 
its influence is carried back to P through the pathway C→I→F→R. To simplify the matters, 
suppose that P introduces a rural development fund for farmers to have access to new 
technologies (P→C). Executing actual transfer of funds, agricultural banks would 
disseminate information on procedures for loan or credit applications (C→I). Extension 
agents, information dissemination workers, private consultants, etc. will all be busy with 
passing this information onto farmers (I→F). The outcome of this process would be either by 
farmers’ organization or by experts in regional information centers or by field researchers 
A visual representation of S[Mechanism] 
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passed to regional extension units of research institutes (F→R). Finally, success or failure of 
the initiative could be reported in a policy dialogue (R→P). Once this cycle of interactions is 
completed, the government would be able to assess the effectiveness of its initiative. Under 
the current circumstances, this feedback pathway cannot be operational in Azerbaijan because 
necessary credit institutions are still absent. 
Decision makers can use the Interaction Matrix to identify the optimal pathway to the 
realization of specific goals. Suppose, for example, that the goal is to diffuse a new variety of 
crops among farmers in a specific location. Clearly, farmers F would be the end users of this 
new variety but agents who pursue this goal might be diverse. For the sake of argument, let 
us suppose that X introduces the new variety. One simple strategy to identify the optimal 
pathway is to list all of the possible pathways starting with X and ending with F. In the 
context of the AIS of Azerbaijan, this experiment would result in the following pathways: 
{X→F}, {X→D→F}, {X→M→F},  {X→I→F}, {X→R→F}, {X→D→M→F}, 
{X→D→I→F}, {X→D→R→F}, {X→I→D→F}, {X→I→R→F}, {X→R→M→F}, 
{X→M→R→F}, {X→R→I→F}, {X→R→D→F}, {X→R→I→D→F}, {X→R→D→I→ 
F}, {X→R→D→M→F}, {X→R→I→D→M→F}, {X→M→R→I→D→F}, assuming that 
the new variety meets official quality standards. Although possible paths are various, only 
few will be qualified when additional constraints are introduced. Let us suppose that farmers 
face budgetary difficulties and are risk averse. This reduces the set of possible pathways to 
{X→M→F}, {X→R→F}, {X→R→M→F}, {X→M→R→F}, {X→R→I→F}, {X→R→D 
→F}, {X→R→I→D→F}, {X→R→D→I→F}, {X→R→D→M→F}, {X→R→I→D→M 
→F}, and {X→M→R→I→D→F}. The rationale behind it is that either profit maximizing 
input-output supply firms, represented by M, or social welfare-maximizing public institutes, 
represented by R, would take the risk by providing farmers with information, inputs, and 
technical support. For the sake of argument, let us suppose that the private value outweighs 
the social value of adopting the new variety, and this would further reduce the feasible paths 
to {X→M→F}, {X→M→R→F}, and {X→M→R→I→D→F}. The optimal choice, which 
is the shortest path and would support the development of market institutions, is {X→M→F} 
as M would provide farmers with extension services. 
The Interaction Matrix can be used to identify constraints of the system. For instance, the 
public and private components of the AIS interact at a low tone. This reflects the fact that the 
system requires intermediary institutions such as marketing associations, farmers’ 
organizations, trade and commerce organizations, etc. to bring together the diffuse elements 
of the system. Specifically, links between the components (I,  M,  F,  P,  R)  could be 
strengthened through policy dialogues where the intermediary institutions could pass 
information from (I, M, F) to (P, R). 
Analysis has shown two trends in the AIS of Azerbaijan. First, as seen from Figure 2, the 
private components are connected around activities initiated by the component X, which is 
the key source of new technologies. They concentrate on adapting the imported technologies 
to local conditions. The component D serves as channel of new technology from X to (I, F, 
M). The public components, however, operate weakly, as they are less flexible in taking 
initiatives or operating around externally determined goals. P and F are the most subordinate 
components. Moreover, the credit component C has very low interaction with the rest of the 
system, which is the area ignored totally, although it is the most vital one to glue the distinct 
elements of the system. Second, as seen from Figure 3, when it comes to the usage of linkage 
mechanisms in List 3 in Temel, Janssen, Karimov (2001) as tools of communication between 





I, F, X) versus low-usage by (R, P, E, M). The mechanisms are most often used by D and I, 
which can be attributed to the fact that these two components are engaged in organized 
activities with specific plans and programs. Other side of the coin is that the working style of 
organizations in X also requires involving parties to operate with work plans and programs. 
Interestingly, however, the components P,  R,  M, and E do not utilize as many linkage 
mechanisms as expected, implying unorganised activities and weak management. 
5.  Conclusions 
This study sought to develop a method for quantitative assessment of institutional interactions 
and illustrated its application to the AIS of Azerbaijan. Analysis suggests that the essential 
elements of the system are at an embryonic stage. Efforts should be placed on the formation 
of public policy, science and technology institutions and organizations, and on the 
development of links through intermediary organizations between the public and private 
components of the system. At present, the public component is under construction, lacking 
sectoral priorities, clear organizational mandates and objectives, qualified human resources, 
physical and financial resources, and motivation to initiate interactions with the private 
sector. The private component, however, is attracted to activities of international 
organizations. The public and private components are isolated and have limited basis for 
interaction. 
What remains to be addressed is to develop methodological guidelines in order to evaluate 
empirically national institutional set-ups with the view of obtaining comparable results at the 
international levels. As argued by Capron and Cincera (2000), the present literature does not 
report any operational guidelines regarding the assessment of institutional linkages 
underpinning national innovation systems. Such guidelines could also be used as a 
benchmarking approach in the management of agricultural, science, and technology policies. 
An equivalently important issue, which has not received enough attention from the literature, 
is, as argued by (Nelson, 1993), the need for well articulated and verified analytical 
frameworks linking institutional arrangements to technological and economic performance. 
Two weaknesses of our method remain to be topics of future research. First, quantitative 
representation of institutional interactions, like we attempted in this study, will be 
questionable especially when rare but influential interactions take place between the 
institutions. An interaction may only be infrequent but of crucial importance, whilst some, 
such as committee meetings, may occur frequently, but may be of low importance in impact. 
Second, the development of solid quantitative measures of policies (or strategies) and the 
testing of specific hypotheses still require a theoretical formulation of institutional objectives 
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Functions in institutional matrix 
F1: General Policy making                                                                                     F4: R&D Performance 
F2: Policy formulation, co-ordination, supervision and assessment                      F5: Technology diffusion 
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Table 1. A Structure for the Agricultural Innovation System: Linkages and Linkage Mechanisms Abbreviations and Acronyms 
 
AASC     Azerbaijan  Agrarian Science Center 
ADB    Asia  Development  Bank 
ADCP     Agricultural Development and Credit Project 
ADPMA            Agricultural Development Project in Mountainous Areas  
AFPU            “Azer-Forest” Production Unit    
AIS    Agricultural  Innovation  System 
ARB     Agricultural Research Board 
AS                 Academy of Sciences                                       
ASDPAS   Agency for Support to the Development of Private Agricultural Sector 
AzAA              Azerbaijan Agricultural Academy 
CGS     Competitive Grants System 
CIMMYT    International Center for Maize and Wheat 
EAF     Euro-Asia Fund 
ERS              Economic Reform Center 
FAO     Food and Agriculture Organization 
FPP     Farm Privatization Project 
HDSREPT   Head Dept. Scientific Research, Education, and Personnel Training 
IARC    International  Agricultural  Research  Center 
ICARDA    International Center for Agricultural Research in Dry Areas 
ICSC     Information and Consulting Services Center 
IDA    International  Development  Association   
IDU     Information Dissemination Unit 
IFAD    International  Fund  for  Agricultural  Development 
GTZ    German  Technical  Support  Society 
MoA     Ministry of Agriculture 
MoE                Ministry of Education 
MoEc     Ministry of Economy 
MoF     Ministry of Finance 
MoT                Ministry of Taxes  
MSP             Ministry of State Property 
nAPC              Non-agricultural Private Colleges  
nASC        Non-agricultural State Colleges 
NARS     National Agricultural Research System 
NGO    Non  Governmental  Organization   
PACF    Private  Agro-Consulting  Firms 
PrU    Private  Universities 
RES                Regional Experimental Stations 
RI                Research Institutes 
SAC                State Agricultural Colleges 
SCEN         State Committee for Ecology and Nature Use 
PCSEC             Permanent Commission for Science, Education an Culture 
SCAR        State Commission for Agrarian Reforms         
SCADPF      State Commission for Assistance to Development of Private Farms  
SSF                 State Seed Farms 
SAIC      State Amelioration & Irrigation Committee   
SLC                 State Land Committee  
SU    State  Universities   
SCST      State Committee on Science and Technology 
SCC      State Customs Committee  
TACIS     Technical Assistance Committee for Independence States     
USAID      United States Agency for International Development 
UNDP    United  Nation  Development  Program   
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I am writing to submit the following study titled Systems Analysis by Graph-theoretic 
Techniques: Assessment of Institutional Linkages in the Agricultural Innovation System of 
Azerbaijan for presentation in the EAAE meetings that will be held in Zaragoza, Spain, on 
28-31 August 2002. Attached please find three (3) copies of the study. I should also note that 
the study should not be considered for poster session. 
This study develops a quantitative, graph-theoretic method for analysing systems of 
institutions. With an application to the agricultural innovation system of Azerbaijan, the 
method is illustrated in detail. An assessment of existing institutional linkages in the system 
suggests that efforts should be placed on the development of intermediary institutions to 
facilitate quick and effective flow of knowledge between the public and the private 
components of the system. Furthermore, significant accomplishments are yet to come in 
policy-making, research and education, and credit institutions. 
I am looking forward to hearing from you. 
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